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Neither the Vietnamese court in Thăng Long nor the Chinese court in Kaifeng could likely have 
imagined that the suppression of the insurgency of Nùng Trí Cao (Nong Zhigao) (1025–53) 
would lead to war. However, the official containment of the frontier chieftain’s three ambitious 
attempts to establish a frontier kingdom in 1042, 1048 and 1052, eventually had the effect of 
escalating tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier region to the point of major conflict. 
Indeed, the pacification campaign launched against Nùng Trí Cao’s followers in the 1050s and 
the subsequent submissions of strategic Tai-speaking frontier communities to direct control of 
the Song dynasty (960–1279), contributed directly to the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese border 
war of 1075–77. 
 




Neither the Vietnamese court in Thăng Long nor the Chinese court in Kaifeng could likely have 
imagined that the suppression of the insurgency of Nùng Trí Cao (Nong Zhigao) (1025–53) 
would lead to war. However, the official containment of the frontier chieftain’s three ambitious 
attempts to establish a frontier kingdom in 1042, 1048 and 1052, eventually had the effect of 
escalating tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier region to the point of major conflict. 
Indeed, the pacification campaign launched against Nùng Trí Cao’s followers in the 1050s and 
the subsequent submissions of strategic Tai-speaking frontier communities to direct control of 
the Song dynasty (960–1279), contributed directly to the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese border 
war of 1075–77. 
 
In the breakdown in relations leading to warfare between the Chinese and Vietnamese states, the 
factor of shifting alliances between the two courts and their respective frontier communities was 
key but hardly all-determinative. Among the other crucial influences were the Chinese court’s 
efforts to increase frontier economic activity under the Song court–sponsored reforms of the 
New Policies (xinfa) (1068–85) that were authored by its grand councilor Wang Anshi (1021–
86) and the consolidation of peripheral fiefdoms by the Vietnamese Lý (1010–1225) court during 
an accelerated period of state-building. Nevertheless, despite these other factors that exacerbated 
regional tensions, in the aftermath of open hostilities, the two courts ultimately did conduct talks 
to negotiate a fixed border between the Ðại Việt kingdom and the Song Empire.1 These talks and 
the establishment of a fixed border marked a diplomatic watershed in middle-period Sino-
Vietnamese relations. In these negotiations one must consider the role the frontier Tai-speaking 
communities played in shaping this firm dividing line between Chinese and Vietnamese 
domains. Control of these communities and their resources was an important consideration in the 
positions taken by both the Song and Lý negotiators. Moreover, the line of demarcation 
established upon the conclusion of these talks would largely remain in place through to the 
present day. 
 
However, a preliminary reading of existing historical sources mostly reveals only a struggle 
between two imperial powers staged among dispossessed Tai-speaking communities. Thus, 
discerning the true nature of frontier relations in this period proves to be a difficult task. The 
available Chinese sources do not readily disclose local concerns, because most of the language 
used even by Song frontier officials in their memorials to the court couched matters in court-
centered contexts. Likewise, extant imperial Vietnamese sources view this period from the 
perspective of the Lý ruler and his closest advisors at court. In our efforts to gain a clearer 
understanding of regional interaction along the frontier in the premodern period, we owe a great 
deal to Vietnamese scholars working in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after 1954. These 
scholars were the first to question the paradigm of a Chinese political and cultural monolith that 
was inherited from French colonial writers. As Patricia Pelley notes, “by emphasizing the ethnic 
heterogeneity of China, by underscoring the tenacity of regional politics in China, and by calling 
attention to South China’s historic links to Southeast Asia, revolutionary scholars managed to 
reduce the apparently monolithic and overwhelmingly Han dimensions of China.”2 However, 
whereas they saw a diversity of interests among the subjects of Chinese rulers, these historians 
unfortunately often also chose to see the subjects of Vietnamese kings as unified in their 
interests. It is foremost their almost invariant depiction of an eleventh-century Vietnamese 
society filled with Kinh and non-Kinh engaged in a “United Front” against Chinese aggression 
from the north with which this chapter takes issue. 
 
These same scholars have also assumed that the Lý court prevailed in its efforts to woo the Tai-
speaking communities of the region over to the Vietnamese. One can easily draw this conclusion 
from existing sources, but there is no denying a strong nationalist bias to these findings. Patriotic 
Vietnamese scholars in the twentieth century have long been interested in countering the picture 
of Vietnamese regional and ethnic disunity promoted in earlier French colonial scholarship. 
Shortly after the seizure and colonization of Vietnam in the late nineteenth century, much French 
colonial academic effort was devoted to the reconstruction of Vietnamese premodern society and 
this fact helps in explaining the relative ease with which Vietnam fell to French domination. 
 
1 Ðinh Bộ Lĩnh (923–80) founded his independent Vietnamese Kingdom with the title Ðại Cồ Việt (968–1054). The 
Lý dynasty ruler Lý Nhật Tôn (b. 1023) would later rename the kingdom Ðại Việt (1054–1400). This title would 
remain in use until the end of the Trần dynasty (1225–1400). 
2 Patricia Pelley, “‘Barbarians’ and ‘Younger Brothers’: The Remaking of Race in Postcolonial Vietnam,” Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies 29.2 (Sept. 1998), p. 376. 
 
Pelley further observes that, “to overcome this characterization, revolutionary writers were 
supposed to recite haranguing clichés about the essential unity and homogeneity of (Vietnam) 
and its indomitable spirit in the fight against foreign aggression.”3 Regarding the eleventh 
century, an influential voice that inspired this group of revolutionary scholars was the historian 
Hoàng Xuân Hãn (1908–96), who had argued in his 1949 seminal work Lý Thường Kiệt that the 
Lý court had a special ability in “giving heart to (phủ dụ)” the uplands peoples, promoting the Lý 
court’s prestige among “the mountain dwellers” further north and helping to maintain peace 
along the Ðại Việt kingdom’s inland frontier.4 Later when Thăng Long sought to attract 
supporters among Tai-speaking communities on the eve of the general Lý Thường Kiệt’s (1019–
1105) invasion of the Song frontier, Hoàng Xuân Hãn argued that the Vietnamese court soon 
benefited from the local knowledge and logistical support provided by these communities.5 
 
In his book, the late Professor Hãn described the Nùng clan as the local representatives of the Lý 
court and the lands they occupied as sovereign Vietnamese territory. At one point he wrote that 
although the frontier leader and Nùng Trí Cao’s kinsman Nùng Tông Ðán (1013–?) and his 
relatives had approached the Song court and had offered the local động settlements of Lôi Hỏa 
and Kề Thành, both of which would later be incorporated into the Song’s “Pacified Prefecture” 
(shun’an zhou) on the northern side of the frontier, to the Song authorities, “the family of Tông 
Ðán still maintained control of his old territory, which therefore was territory that still belonged 
to Vietnam.”6 Following the publication of Lý Thường Kiệt, Hoàng Xuân Hãn’s opinions 
continued to influence future generations of Vietnamese scholars, who saw an undeniable unity 
of purpose between the Vietnamese court and the uplands frontier peoples in the face of Chinese 
aggression of the mid-eleventh century. 
 
Other Vietnamese historians have emphasized Nùng Tông Ðán’s participation in Lý Thường 
Kiệt’s preemptive attack on Song territory as a clear sign that the Lý court had wisely cultivated 
strong relations with its Tai-speaking neighbors. Conservative scholar and former prime minister 
Trần Trọng Kim (1883–1953) noted in his influential historical survey Việt Nam Sử Lược that 
Tông Ðán held a high leadership position in the Lý military force, perhaps even ranking him on 
par with Lý Thường Kiệt.7 Nguyễn Ngọc Huy (b. 1924) notes in his work on the Lê Code that 
“one result of (the LM court’s) benevolent policy toward minority leaders was their effective 
support for the dynasty in the successful campaigns against the Sung.”8 Lê Thành Khôi contends 
that the Lý policy of fostering alliances with the uplands communities eventually “bore its 
fruits,” and he notes Tông Ðán’s leadership role in Lý Thường Kiệt’s military force as a prime 
example of this success.9 Professor Phan Huy Lê of Hà Nội National University, in turn quoting 
Hoàng Xuân Hãn, has written, “Generally speaking, all of the Lý court’s wise policies (regarding 
local chieftains) were successful and they held a important significance during preparations for 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Lý Thường Kiệt: Lịch Sư Ngoại Giao Trều Lý (Hanoi, 1949), p. 94. 
5 Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Lý Thường Kiệt, p. 260. 
6 Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Lý Thường Kiệt, p. 122. 
7 Trần Trọng Kim, Việt Nam Sử Lược (rpr. Glendale, CA, 1982), 1:103. 
8 Nguyen Ngoc Huy, The Le Code: Law in Traditional Vietnam: A Comparative Sino-Vietnamese Legal Study with 
Historical-Juridical Analysis and Annotations, vol. 1 (Athens, OH, 1987), p. 10. 
9 Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam (Paris, 1981), pp. 158, 160. 
the victorious battle with the Song during the years 1075–77.”10 In another recent study 
produced by the Bureau for National Defense in the Vietnamese Institute of Military History Lê 
Ðình Sỹ writes, “The Lý were concerned to protect ‘the silk and brocade’ (i.e. our beautiful) 
fatherland’s territorial integrity, as well as the independence and the autonomy of our people.”11 
Ethnologists working on the history of Tai-speaking groups in Vietnam have voiced similar 
opinions. Hà Văn Thư and Lã Văn Lô wrote in 1984 that “when the Song invaded our country, 
all of the local militia (comprised of uplands people) joined together in the cause at strategically 
important sites, carrying out surprise attacks on the military gatherings and supply lines of the 
enemy.”12 A more recent ethnographic work reiterates this same event in the historical 
introduction.13 
 
I believe that the abovementioned historiographical imperative for solidarity has unduly 
influenced many of these Vietnamese scholars to claim that, when the two courts clashed in open 
conflict in 1075, the Lý leadership benefited more from uplands support than did the Song 
leadership. On the contrary, I maintain that the Chinese authorities successfully cultivated 
relations with these uplands communities, particularly with the declared followers of Nùng Trí 
Cao and his clan, and that this change in frontier policy alarmed the lowlands Vietnamese court 
and its uplands supporters to such a degree that the “offense as the best defense” military strategy 
promoted by the Lý military aide Lý Thường Kiệt was eventually adopted. 
 
Growing Chinese Interest in the South 
 
Through the 1060s, longstanding political institutions shaped the respective frontier policies of 
the Song and Lý courts. For the Chinese leadership, frontier policy served the “centering” 
function of the traditional tribute system.14 Ideally, the Chinese court’s frontier administration, 
known as the system of ruling with “loose reins” (jimi), sought to introduce to its “uncultured” 
inhabitants all the benefits of life at the “civilized” center.15 This zone system of frontier 
management had served the Chinese leadership adequately in the southwest since the Tang 
dynasty (618–907), and there had been little incentive to change the status quo. The Ðại Việt 
leadership, unlike the Song, did not follow a center-periphery zonal arrangement, but instead 
maintained personalized “patron-client” relationships with each of its “satellite” partners along 
the frontier region.16 Moreover, for economic and political purposes, Vietnamese leaders 
 
10 Phan Huy Lê, “Nùng Trí Cao Nhân Vật Lịch Sử và Biểu Tương Văn Hóa” in Nùng Trí Cao: kỷ yếu hội thảo khoa 
học, ed. Trần Văn Phượng (Cao Bằng, 1995), p. 178. See also Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Lý Thường Kiệt, pp. 81–97. 
11 Lê Ðình Sỹ, Kế sách giữ nước thòi Lý-Trần (Hanoi, 1994), p. 9. 
12 Hà Văn Thư and Lã Văn Lô, Văn hóa Tày Nùng (Hanoi, 1984), p. 9. 
13 Bế Viết Ðẳng, Các dân tộc Tây, Nùng ở Việt Nam (Hanoi, 1992), p. 54. 
14 James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, 
1995), p. 123. 
15 I have located the first recorded reference to this institution of frontier management in the Confucian classic Book 
of History (Shangshu) in the following passage: “Beyond the Nine Principalities (i.e., the North China Central Plain) 
was barbarian territory. Here the (Zhou) ruler had installed barbarians who ruled with a loose rein and nothing else. 
This was because these people could not be made the same as those who accepted Central Plain (Hua Xia) ways.” 
Cited in Ruan Yuan, Shisan jing zhu (Beijing, 1980). 
16 Although this statement refers to Wolters’s work, I nonetheless note that in the second edition of History, Culture, 
and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Wolters does not contend that premodern Vietnam followed his well-
known “mandala” model of Southeast Asian political organization. Cited in O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and 
Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca; Singapore, 1999), pp. 143–44. 
depended on controlling the resources of the frontier, whether material and human. To achieve 
this control, they employed a combination of marriage alliances and military excursions to 
ensure their supremacy in the region. Moreover, successive Vietnamese courts took the 
projection of influence along the frontier as indicative of their efficacy, which was measured 
primarily in resources extracted rather than the “centering” of loyalty among frontier vassals. 
 
However, by the eleventh century, both Chinese and Vietnamese courts viewed these frontier 
communities as a ready pool of able personnel to contribute to what Jeffery Barlow has termed 
the “military labor market.”17 Chinese regimes had in the past used militia assembled from the 
Tai-speaking frontier communities in their armed conflicts with Vietnamese forces based in the 
Hung River Delta region. During the period of the Five Dynasties (907–60) and Ten Kingdoms 
(907–79), the Southern Han (907–71) founder Liu Yin (r. 907–11) recruited troops from the 
southern Guangxi region, among them archers, for assist in the war then being waged against the 
kingdom of Chu (927–56).18 These troops were well known for their ferocity. In 930, the 
Southern Han ruler Liu Gong (r. 911–42) recruited more local militia to help with the invasion of 
northern Vietnam, then under the command of the Vietnamese strongman Khúc Thừa Mý (917–
30). Fifty years later, when the Song court launched its punitive attack on Lê Hoàn (r. 980–
1005), the Chinese army gathered up another contingent of southern militia from the frontier 
region to supplement its northern forces.19 Given the reputation for bravery in battle, this Tai-
speaking militia was considered a valuable military asset and a worthy ally in frontier conflicts. 
By 1065, some 44,500 militia soldiers from these communities were enlisted by local Song 
authorities.20 These numbers could suggest that the Chinese court was eager to tap this source of 
military manpower. However, this increase in recruitment could also reflect a rapid shift in 
political loyalties in the region.  
 
The successful expedition of the Song general Di Qing (1008–61) against the Nùng Trí Cao’s 
rebel army and the Lý court’s refusal to intervene on either side brought a tentative peace to the 
frontier region. For nearly twenty years after Nùng Trí Cao’s defeat, frontier disturbances rarely 
occurred, and Chinese and Vietnamese military resources contained whatever disorder that did 
occur swiftly. Han homesteaders and discharged soldiers also moved to the area at this time, and 
settled in existing Chinese communities and on the outskirts of jimi regions. Simultaneously, 
new local leaders took control of the decimated but still remaining frontier communities. 
However, the regional peace would not last. The ethnic balance along the frontier was changing 
and the Song imperial presence along the edges of a frontier that the Lý leadership itself desired 
to control was growing. Several influential Nùng leaders sided with the Vietnamese court in the 
emerging confrontation and, in the ensuing conflict, Kaifeng realized that an entirely new 
arrangement for frontier relations had to be established. 
 
Manipulating the Frontier 
 
 
17 Jeffery G. Barlow. The Zhuang [online]. Pacific University, 2000. [Cited July 16, 2001]. Available from World 
Wide Web: (http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/resources/zhuang/zhuang8.htm).  
18 Barlow. The Zhuang [online], [Cited July 4, 2001]. 
19 Li Tao, Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian (Beijing, 1985), 22.490–91. This work is hereafter referred to as XZZTJCB. 
20 Toghto [Tuotuo], Songshi (Beijing, 1983), 191.4746. This work is hereafter referred to as SS. 
Although it was unsuccessful in establishing an autonomous frontier state equal in political 
resilience to the late Tang-period Uyghur state of the Tarim Basin alluded to by Michael Brose in 
this volume, the revolt of the 1050s Tai-speaking leader Nùng Trí Cao’s had nonetheless 
exposed weaknesses in the Song administration of its southern region. Furthermore, frontier 
unrest threatened to begin anew with a new generation of Nùng leadership. In tenth month of 
1060, the frontier administrator Wang Han (fl. 1043–63) memorialized the throne, stating that 
Nùng Trí Cao’s fellow clansman, Nùng Tông Ðán had already crossed back into Song territory 
in 1057.21 Tông Ðán had since assembled a following and was now threatening to plunder the 
region. Following rumors that Nùng Trí Cao was actually still alive, Wang visited Tông Ðán’s 
camp at Lôi Hỏa, and spoke with Trí Cao’s son Nùng Nhật Tân (fl. 1050–78). According to the 
History of the Song (Songshi), Wang said the following to the frontier leader’s son,” If you seek 
“Interior Dependency” (neifu) status with the Song court, the Vietnamese will see you as an 
enemy. If you remain outside (China proper) as a loyal frontier militia leader, you can expect to 
be rewarded with tempting profit. Therefore, there is no need for scheming. Now, return home to 
report this news to your father, and then to choose the path that offers the greatest benefit.”22 
 
As the Guangnan West circuit Fiscal Commissioner (zhuanyunshi) Wang Han feared that the 
Nùng clan’s resurgence could spell the end to peace on the frontier. Therefore, he requested that 
a new policy be enacted. The Song court responded by ignoring Wang’s specific 
recommendation and instead requesting that the Nùng communities, along with other ethnic 
groups, be made interior dependencies of the Song Empire. In this manner, the troubles between 
the Song and its frontier temporarily subsided. Nùng Trí Cao’s followers had achieved the 
elevated “Interior Dependency” status Trí Cao and his father had initially been seeking, although 
at the cost of many lives. However, Nùng Trí Cao had later fought for no less than his own 
kingdom stretching across southern China. Such an independent polity within China’s borders 
would not emerge until the “Warlord Period” (1916–28) of the early twentieth century. 
 
Moreover, the Song court acknowledged the Nùng clan’s continued regional influence by 
accepting Tông Ðán’s renewed local leadership. Xiao Gu, then the court-appointed military 
commissioner (jinglueshi), advised the court to return Tông Ðán’s followers to official service by 
peaceful means, including a treaty alliance and new honorary titles. By the summer of 1061, 
however, even the emperor was lamenting the fact that the “Nùng Bandit (Tông Ðán)” and his 
family had strayed so far from the observance of their frontier duties that the Chinese ruler 
thought they might never really return to the imperial fold.23 Yet, when Tông Ðán in 1062 
requested that the territories under his authority be incorporated into the Chinese empire, 
Emperor Renzong (r. 1022–63) accommodated this request. 
 
The Chinese ruler then extended a new set of titles and nominal positions to leading members of 
frontier communities, at a level of authority below the titles granted to the Vietnamese court and 
its officials. The Draft of Documents Pertaining to Song Official Matters (Song huiyao) records 
that the “Loyal Warrior” (wuzong jiangjun) Tông Ðán, regarded by the Song court to be the 
prefect of Lôi Hỏa, recently renamed “Pacified Prefecture” (shun’an zhou), was granted the title 
 
21 SS, 12.241. 
22 SS, 312.10244. 
23 SS, 12.247. 
“Personal Guardian General of the Right” (you qianniu weijiangjun).24 Nùng Trí Cao’s younger 
brother Nùng Trí Hội (fl.1062–85) received the title “Personal Guardian General of the Left” 
(zuo qianniu weijiangjun). Other members of the Nùng clan, and former followers of Trí Cao, 
also received official recognition. Nùng Binh (?–?), Nùng Lượng (?–?), Nùng Hạ Khanh (?–?), 
local leaders from the Temo jimi prefecture, which encompassed territory from modern-day 
Wenshan in eastern Yunnan to Jingxi in southern Guangxi, swore their loyalty to the Song 
court.25 Nùng Hạ Khanh was almost certainly Nùng Trí Cao’s mother A Nùng’s third husband, a 
fact that may or may not have been known to Xiao Go and the other Song officials, who 
adminsitered the area. However, Trí Cao’s own former rebel commanders Lư Báo (?–?), Lê Mạo 
(?–?), and Hoàng Trọng Khanh (?–?) were all granted official titles that denoted service at the 
local level to the Song court.26 In all of these titles, there is an element of reorienting local 
authority to a position much more dependent on the centralized authority of the Song court, 
suggesting integration that was similar to the alliances of local Uyghur military leaders and Tang 
military officials that David Graff describes in his chapter. These titles were granted with the 
condition that they might be withdrawn at any point that their holders do no live up to the official 
obligations that these titles implied. 
 
In the wake of all these administrative appointments, the jimi prefectures had lost their 
autonomous status in the eyes of the Song leadership. The change was not limited to new titles 
alone. Local militia along the southwestern frontier were reorganized and trained to comply with 
new court standards for frontier defense. In 1065, the local military commission (anfu si) of 
Guangnan West circuit (Guangnan xilu), under the direction of the new Guizhou prefect Lu Shen 
(1012–70), took charge of the organization of communities along the southwestern frontier.27 
The forty-five grotto settlements in the Left and Right Rivers (Zuoyou jiang) region were all 
appointed a grotto militia leader (dongjiang). The commissioner then surveyed the region’s 
population of able-bodied men, from which he selected groups to be led by a guard commander 
(xiaochang) from the area’s prominent households. Each guard commander then received a 
specific signal banner (qihao) for his group’s distinction. Groups of thirty men were organized 
into self-regulating units of local governance known as “tithings (jia).”28 Tithings received 
different leaders when they were organized in groups of five led by a troop commandant (dutou), 
groups of ten led by an aboriginal commander (zhijunshi), and groups of fifty led by a 
commander-in-chief (duzhijunshi). 
 
As noted above, some 44,500 local men along the southwestern frontier may have been 
registered under this new system. At least on paper, these efforts to organize frontier militia went 
far beyond any previous attempts under the existing jimi frontier system of management. The 
 
24 Xu Song, Song huiyao jiben (Taibei, 1964), 198.7799. This work is hereafter referred to as SHY. 
25 SHY, 198.7799. An interesting question involves whether these Nùng leaders were expressing personal loyalty to 
Emperor Yingzong. The SHY account is ambiguous and therefore does not provide us with a clear answer to this 
question. 
26 The SHY account mistakenly conflates the names of LD Báo and Li Mao as “Lu Mao.” See Shen Kua’s account 
for the proper listing of names. Shen Kua, Mengxi bitan in Wenbai duizhao Mengxi bitan quanyi. 
27 SS, 191.4746. 
28 See Charles Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford, 1985), p. 137. Hucker contends 
that the leaders of “tithings” were known as “tithing chiefs” (jiazhang) or “tithing heads” (jiatou), while the SS 
account uses an older Han-period title “guard commander” (xiaozhang). See Hucker, Dictionary of Official Titles, p. 
234. 
military reorganization of the frontier and the recruitment of local militia resembled what 
Michael McGrath herein describes as the 1041 efforts of Emperor Renzong to fortify Shaanxi 
against military attack by the neighboring Tanguts. Perhaps for that reason, this tightening of 
frontier defenses on the Song side did not bode well with the Vietnamese court, which saw its 
own flexible and personally orientated systems of local control being gradually undermined. 
 
Moreover, greater numbers of Song subjects from the north were moving into the region during 
this period. Scholars have noted a sharp increase in population numbers along China’s southwest 
frontier by the end of the eleventh century. During the period 976–84, the total population of the 
prefectures of Yongzhou, Binzhou, Xiangzhou (modern-day Xiangzhou county in central 
Guangxi), Rongzhou (modern-day Rongan county in Guangxi), Hengzhou, Liuzhou (modern-
day Liuzhou city) and Yizhou was estimated to be in the area of 17,760 households, and by the 
period 1078–85 populations for the same area had increased to 56,596 households.29 Moreover, 
figures for the entire Guangnan West circuit for 1080 place the region’s population at 287,723 
households, a 133 percent increase from an earlier Tang census in 742.30 One should note that 
these figures included both indigenous communities and the more recent Han settlements. 
Moreover, improved methods of recording household registration may indeed accord for some of 
the increase. However, the trend toward increased Han settlement remains clear through these 
changes; an increase accounted for by both the community of soldiers who had followed Di Qing 
in his campaign against Nùng Trí Cao’s forces, and the merchants who provided support for the 
Song military. 
 
The Republican period gazetteer A Record of Fengshan County (Fengshan xianzhi) makes this 
point; “Before the Tang, this county was settled by the Miao barbarian people. There were no 
traces of Han settlers. In 1053, The ‘Great Martial Leader’ Di (Qing) put down the rebellion of 
the Quang Nguyên barbarian Nùng Trí Cao, the troops following the general’s expedition 
remained in the region to open up and settle the wasteland. Their settlements extended 
throughout this county.”31 
 
Li Wenxiong in his early-twentieth-century gazetteer A Record of Longjin County (Longjin 
xianzhi) (modern-day Longzhou county in Guangxi) extends this population shift right down to 
the frontier in his observations: 
 
Longjin county before the Tang was a part of Giao Chỉ (or Vietnamese) territory. Its 
inhabitants were subjects of Giao Chỉ. In 1052, Zhao Ding (?–?),32 following the success 
of the Di (Wuxiang) Qing in his campaign against the barbarians, was appointed to the 
 
29 The Taiping xingguo period figures may be found in Yue Shi, Taiping huanyu ji (Record of the Empire’s Borders 
and Dimensions during the Taiping Period). The Yuanfeng period figures may be found in Wang Cun, Yuanfeng 
jiuyu ji. This information is cited in Huang Xianfan, Nong Zhigao (Nanning, 1983), p. 91. 
30 These regional figures are cited in Huang Xianfan, Zhuangzu tongshi (Nanning, 1988), p. 52. The Song number is 
contained in Wang Cun’s Yuanfeng jiuyu ji, while the Tang figure is available in the “geography” (dili) section of 
the New History of the Tang (Xin Tangshu) of Ouyang Xiu (1007–72). A graph in Huang’s book (p. 53) offers a 
Song population figure of 387,723 households, which appears to be a mistake. 
31 Fengshan county in this gazetteer entry was comprised of today’s Donglan and Fengshan counties, located in 
northwestern Guangxi province. This information is cited in Huang Xianfan, Nong Zhigao, pp. 91–92. 
32 Li Wenxiong may have been mistaken about Zhao Ding’s participation. Zhao was a Song official, but he lived 
from 1085 to 1147. 
hereditary position of local administrator. A division of General Di’s soldiers from the 
Shandong region entered the area to settle down. Because of this event, many settlers 
from north of the Yangzi River moved into the area to live. After the barbarian 
wastelands had started to be controlled (by the Song court), settlers from Fujian (min), 
Jiangxi (gan), Hunan (xiang), and the Guangdong (yue) region daily flocked to the 
region. Some came to take positions as local officials, and they married into the local 
community. Some came as merchants, marrying into the region as well. Most of these 
Han homesteaders settled in the larger towns or the marketplaces. However, there were 
certainly those gathered in the rural villages to conduct their business.33 
 
Throughout the Song Empire the word had spread that new opportunities could now be found in 
this southernmost outpost of imperial control, and many now were more than willing to try their 
luck in its settlement. 
 
A cultural shift had also begun to take place in the region, with an increased emphasis on North 
Chinese or “Central Plain” (zhongyuan) practices. A Record of the Empire’s Borders and 
Dimensions during the Taiping Period (Taiping huanyuji) by Yue Shi (930–1007) describes the 
earliest signs of change. Huang Xianfan contends that this trend accelerated during the period 
after the fall of North China to Jürchen armies, as noted in A Record of This Region’s Merits 
(Yudi jisheng) by Wang Xiangzhi (d. after 1221); “following the Song’s ‘Southern Push’ 
(nandu), i.e., fall to the Jin, when many northerners moved south to escape their homelands, 
clothing styles, ceremonials caps, rituals and music then became the same as those practices in 
North China.”34 However, these social practices were actually brought into the region by Di 
Qing’s troops and the accompanying cadre of local officials. If the Guangnan region had not had 
strong ties with court culture during the early Song period, these ties were laid in place and 
strengthened with each wave of northern settlers that poured into the frontier. 
 
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese court pursued a policy of expansion, with military expeditions to the 
south against neighboring Champa, along with pacification campaigns to assert direct court 
control over indigenous communities located along the northern frontier. Lý Phật Mã died late in 
1054, and the Khai Hoàng prince Lý Nhật Tôn ascended the throne to preside over a Vietnamese 
Kingdom that had become increasingly “united and self-assured.”35 Lý Phật Mã had already 
started a court-organized movement toward frontier settlement and control, and this trend 
continued unabated throughout the period of unrest involving Nùng Trí Cao. 
 
Soon there was more evidence of Viet expansion in the frontier region. In 1059 the Lý court 
made the additional effort to take direct control of its frontier and the local manpower. The court 
divided the northern frontier in the Left and Right Rivers region into the new administrative 
units; Ngự Long, Vũ Thắng, Long Dực, Thần Ðiện, Bổng Thánh, Bảo Thắng (Bảo Thắng county 
in modern-day Lào Cai province), Hùng Lược, and Vạn Tiệp.36 To each of these units the court 
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assigned an official serving Thắng Long’s interest. In the most expressive gesture on regional 
dominance, Lý Nhật Tôn ordered that militia units be established among the local communities 
and that conscripts all have the characters “Army of the Son of Heaven” (tianzi jun) tattooed on 
their foreheads.37 This practice had existed since early times, and had last been practiced by Lê 
Hoàn in assembling his own militia forces. The emphasis on the control of regional manpower 
reflects a distinctly Southeast Asian system of statecraft.38 Most importantly, it indicated that the 
Lý desired to tap its frontier resources in a novel manner to fuel efforts at regional expansion. 
Resources at this point in time largely referred to human resources. 
 
During the early 1060s, the Sino-Vietnamese frontier experienced numerous local disturbances 
among the indigenous communities, in response perhaps to the influx of settlers from the north. 
Moreover, there were clashes between troops serving both the Chinese and Vietnamese courts. In 
the spring of 1060, the elderly chieftain of the frontier prefecture Lạng Châu and imperial in-law 
through a marriage alliance Thàn Thiệu Thạ́i (?–?) crossed into Song territory to raid frontier 
settlements for cattle and new militia recruits.39 Thiệu Thạ́i also captured the local Song military 
leader Yang Baocai (?–?) in the attack. In the autumn of 1060, Song troops crossed the frontier. 
However, the Chinese were unsuccessful in their attempt to bring Yang back.40 
 
Kaifeng soon dispatched the newly appointed military commissioner (anfu shi) Yu Jing (1000–
1064) to the Guangnan region to quell unrest stirred up by Giap Ðồng natives led by Thiệu Thạ́i. 
Fighting there had already claimed the lives of five military inspectors (xunjian).41 Once he 
reached the south, Yu Jing also sent a court representative secretly to Champa to enlist Cham 
support for a possible allied attack on Vietnamese communities in Guangnan.42 This increased 
activity along the frontier naturally caught the attention of the Vietnamese court, which 
reportedly had also caught wind of the Cham plot. As the Song court took a greater interest in the 
frontier region, a new court policy emerged of courting local leaders directly, rather than relying 
on the assistance of their tribute representative in the Vietnamese court. Such a shift in behavior 
undercut the local authority that official tributary relations with the Chinese had once afforded 
Thăng Long. As the Song court began to seek local leaders to implement its regional interests, 
even in opposition to Vietnamese interests, the Ðại Cồ Việt court sought ways to make their own 
presence felt along the frontier. 
 
However, the Lý court likely saw merit in defusing what had become a tense relationship with 
the Song. In the following year, a delegation from Thăng Long led by Bi Gia Dụ (?–?) traveled 
to Yongzhou to negotiate terms for peace with Yu Qing himself.43 Lý Nhật Tôn instructed his 
court “send an envoy into China to convey thanks (for quelling the earlier disturbances), but 
continue to collect more intelligence on Cham troops, Yu Qing’s forces, and other troops 
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stationed in the Guangnan Western circuit.”44 The Chinese delegation again requested the return 
of Yang Baocai, but this requested was denied.45 Given the recent unrest, however, the Chinese 
emperor Renzong hesitated to raise tensions further along the southern frontier, and he ordered 
his delegated military leaders of his local military commissions to refrain from assembling troops 
in the region. The Song ruler then allowed a tribute mission from Thăng Long to travel to 
Kaifeng for an imperial audience. On February 8, 1063 (by the Western calendar), the two 
Vietnamese envoys offered tribute to the Song emperor that included nine tamed elephants, a gift 
that the Vietnamese leaders then considered their most precious offering.46 Sino-Vietnamese 
relations appeared at this stage to have reached a new equilibrium. 
 
However, within months, the relationship between the two courts had changed once again. On 
March 30, 1063 the Song emperor Renzong passed away, and the heir-apparent Zhao Shu 
(Yingzong, r. 1063–67) came to power. Vietnamese envoys soon arrived in Kaifeng to 
congratulate the ascension of the new emperor. On April 7, 1063 Yingzong made an important 
imperial gesture by sending gifts, such as calligraphic compositions in the hand of the late ruler 
Renzong, to the Vietnamese court. Such gift was likely an acknowledgment that the Vietnamese 
ruler and his advisors were learned enough to appreciate the literary refinement of these works 
and that they fell within the wider circle of zhongyuan culture. Yingzong also granted the ruler 
Lý Nhật Tôn the post concurrent manager of governmental affairs in the Secretariat-Chancellery 
(tongzhong shumen xiaping zhangshi).47 The Song emperor’s purpose for granting this office 
was likely to reinforce from the outset of his reign the image of the Vietnamese court as an 
extension of the Chinese central court and to preserve the position of Lý Nhật Tôn as both a 
frontier official and a participant in the formulation of central court policy. However, this gesture 
on the part of the Song court did not completely ameliorate tensions on the frontier. 
 
On the same day that the Vietnamese envoy Lý Kế Tiên (?–?) prepared to depart Kaifeng, news 
arrived from the south that a frontier militia under the leadership of errant clan leader Thàn Thiệu 
Thạ́i had engaged in yet another attack on settlements within Guangnan West circuit.48 A 
Guangnan official sent an urgent plea to Kaifeng for an immediate punitive attack on the 
southern intruders. However, Chinese sources record that the Song court had come to the 
conclusion that Thàn Thiệu Thạ́i was “reckless and mad,” perhaps as a conscious effort to 
divorce his actions from those of the Vietnamese court. In any case, an envoy from Thăng Long 
had already been dispatched to Kaifeng to ask forgiveness for the attack. Yingzong, therefore, 
did not raise an army to deal with this problem. Local Song officials may have wanted a stronger 
response from Kaifeng, but the Song ruler maintained that his vassals were still capable of self-
regulation. 
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More than a year passed before any further troubles arose. On November 18, 1064, the Guizhou 
prefect Lu Shen memorialized the throne during a court visit by Vietnamese envoys. Lu reported 
a military delegation from Thăng Long had allegedly come across the frontier in search of Nùng 
Tông Ðán’s son Nùng Nhật Tân and his followers, but this same delegation show an interest in 
taking control of a section of Song territory, including the Wenmen dong (Wenmen Grotto, 
located near Hurun village in modern-day Jingxi county) jimi district.49 Although the court took 
no specific action as a result of this memorial, Lu appeared determined to expand the Song’s 
military presence in the south. 
 
After delivering his memorial, Lu Shen set out along the frontier to Yongzhou. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, he commissioned forty-five local aboriginal leaders from the Left and 
Right River region as military officers in his growing militia. When he had assembled the 
abovementioned 44,500 seasoned troops, he ordered his force to repair and fortify military 
installations in the region. He also requested that local Song administrators cast special seals for 
his militia leaders. Lu also petitioned the Song court with a request that the Left and Right River 
region be exempted from the payment of all back taxes.50 Lu took all these measures to gain the 
loyalties of those communities that one generation previously had joined Nùng Trí Cao in his 
rebellion against the throne. The effort to provide military training for the leaders of this frontier 
militia was a variation on existing court policy, but Lu’s methods built on Kaifeng’s growing 
interest in a more direct incorporation of these frontier areas. 
 
After witnessing these events along the frontier, Vietnamese officials became quite concerned. 
Thăng Long immediately sent a tribute-bearing envoy to Kaifeng to “send their greetings” as 
well as to remind the Chinese court of the precedent of relying on Vietnamese authorities to 
settle frontier matters. Meanwhile, Lu had again memorialized the throne, requesting that the 
court offer special training and indoctrination to one local chieftain (tuding) each year. Following 
this training regime, after three years this chieftain would be made a member of the official 
bureaucracy.51 
 
At about this same time, it appears that Nùng Tông Ðán had decided to switch allegiances. It 
may have been that the local chieftain saw his traditional base of power eroding rapidly under the 
new system of frontier management set in place by Lu Shen. The evidence is rather scanty; 
however, according to the Songshi, at some point after late 1065, Tông Ðán made overtures to 
join in an alliance with Lý Nhật Tôn and the Quảng Nguyên chieftain Lưu Ký (?–?).52 Fearing a 
potentially hostile coalition so close to home, Lu Shen sent an envoy to announce this news to 
the Song court. Emperor Yingzong, a mentally weak and distracted ruler by this point, 
apparently took no other action than to reassign Tông Ðán his honorific titles. This lack of 
attention from the center was to have a harmful effect regarding the vitality of the Song presence 
along the frontier. As highlighted in the Vietnamese sources, at this point, Tông Ðán became a 
willing and able ally of the Lý court to perform a key military role in the 1075–77 conflict. 
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This alliance between Tông Ðán and the Quảng Nguyên chieftain Lưu Ký had its roots in the 
third rebellion of Nùng Trí Cao. Shen Kua argues in Mengxi bitan that among Trí Cao’s chief 
supporters for his initial assault on the Hengshan Garrison prior to the attack on Yongzhou were 
Lư Báo, Lê Mạo and Hoàng Trọng Khanh and Liệu Thông (?–?).53 When the rebellion was 
finally suppressed, Lư Báo called together Trí Cao’s disbanded rebel army and eventually 
returned to Quang Nguyên, where the entire group had pledged its loyalty to Lưu Ký. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Song court rewarded this group with official titles, despite 
their direct participation in Nùng Trí Cao’s insurrection and their ties to Lưu Ký. The Song 
support for these local leaders would have mixed results. By 1069, Lư Báo and another of Trí 
Cao’s kin Nùng Trí Hội had announced their support for the Song court, while Nùng Tông Ðán 
and Lưu Ký would cast their lot with the Vietnamese court. The greatest change in the balance of 
relations in this period came with the rise in Kaifeng of the young emperor Shenzong, who 
ushered in a new approach to frontier management. 
 
On January 8, 1067, Yingzong passed away and his son Zhao Xu, posthumously known as Song 
emperor Shenzong. (r. 1067–85), ascended to the throne. Shenzong followed his father by 
rewarding all well-wishers generously during the first days of his reign. However, he appeared to 
pay special attention to the Vietnamese delegation. When Thăng Long dispatched a mission to 
greet the new emperor, Shenzong presented the envoys with a lavish array of gifts: set of official 
robes for the Lý household, a golden belt, 200 liang of silver ingots, three hundred bolts of silk, 
two horses, and a saddle inlaid with gold and silver plating.54 On February 9, 1067, Shenzong 
decreed that Lý Nhật Tôn should be granted the title “King of the Southern Pacified Region” 
(nanping wang). Reestablishing the tribute relations between the two courts according to terms 
set at the beginning of the dynasty appears to have been the initial aim of the young emperor. 
However, Chinese frontier officials in the emperor’s service at the same time were training for 
military action along the southern edge of the empire. 
 
By late 1067, there was more movement on the Song side of the frontier region. The new 
Guizhou prefect Zhang Tian (fl. 1068–77) reported that “through interviews I have heard that the 
Quảng Nguyên Châu official Lưu Kỷ maintains ties with Lư Báo, despite the fact that Lưu Kỷ is 
an official in the service of Lý Nhật Tôn. Lư Báo is a member of Nùng Trí Cao’s treacherous 
faction, still located in Quảng Nguyên Châu. Lưu Kỷ is currently planning to cause mischief of 
some sort, and Lư Báo now intends to seek personal glory by crossing over into Chinese 
territory. I want to halt Lư Báo and crush his followers.”55 The Song court’s Bureau of Military 
Affairs (qumiyuan) replied to this report with the following, 
 
Lư Báo is certainly a member of Nùng Trí Cao’s treacherous faction. However, any 
action against Lưu Kỷ cannot be allowed. If commoners chose to cross the frontier (into 
Song territory), they will be targeted and executed. However, it is not necessary to send 
military officials to pursue their leaders and the Vietnamese army. The court does not 
treat prisoners according to the ritual protocol expected of outer barbarians (waiyi). If this 
Lưu Kỷ chooses to transfer the administration of his prefecture back to China, such 
action ought to be accepted. Therefore, it is not necessary to attract these people, but 
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instead officials should record the fact that Lưu Kỷ is approaching, and that Quảng 
Nguyên has no other leader. It is not necessary to launch a defense of our territory until 
Lưu Kỷ has advanced into Han-controlled territory. If he doesn’t, then let the situation 
settle and the problem will fade.56 
 
The Song court chose to follow this policy, suddenly abandoning the balance of power along the 
frontier that the court had always advocated in its tribute relations with the Vietnamese 
leadership. 
 
By 1069, however, Lư Báo had instead offered his allegiances to the Song court, while Lưu Kỷ 
had remained in the Quảng Nguyên region, nominally under the control of Thăng Long.57 In the 
late summer, the Vietnamese court sent a tribute mission north to maintain good relations with 
the court at Kaifeng. Shortly thereafter, perhaps to counter Tông Ðán’s defection, the young 
Chinese emperor confirmed the Nùng clan’s frontier status by conferring on Nùng Trí Hội, now 
seen by the Chinese as the sole leader of Quảng Nguyên’s adjoining settlements of Guwu and 
Shun’an (Lôi Hỏa), a variation on Tông Ðán’s former title “Great General and Personal 
Guardian General of the Right” (dajiangjun wei youqianniu).58 The Chinese leadership hoped to 
maintain a solid ally in the region, even through this period of rapid change. 
 
In late 1071, local Song officials again appraised the court of the shifting allegiances among 
local leaders. The Guangnan military commissioner Xiao Gu reported to Kaifeng, “the 
Vietnamese official Lưu Kỷ has been sighted at the head of more than two hundred men in the 
vicinity of Shun’an prefecture. We have not yet determined how many Vietnamese have joined 
his entourage.”59 Lưu Kỷ’s action had been deemed as particularly interesting, given his earlier 
overtures and the recent alliance forged with Quảng Nguyên’s other influential leader Nùng Trí 
Hội. The Song court responded to Xiao Gu’s memorial, “Recently I have received repeated 
reports that Quảng Nguyên’s “barbarian bandits (manzei)” have been gathering (for unlawful 
reasons), and there seems to be no end in sight for these occurrences. These disturbances have 
now unsettled the general populace in the grotto settlements. However, I’m concerned that the 
bandits cannot help but to act in a crafty manner.”60 The Song court was well aware of the effect 
that locally influential leaders still had in a region that Kaifeng now wished to have some say. 
However, the only effective strategy appeared to be the manipulation of chieftains with 
significant followings, and hope that these individuals would not one day switch sides. 
 
Political changes on the Vietnamese side of the frontier resulted in further changes to the extant 
network of relations and, by the 1060s, Lý rulers had become more comfortable viewing 
themselves as a dynastic power with the imperial authority and apparatus of power needed to 
maintain a long-term command over their expanding territory. Lý Phật Mã, second ruler of the 
dynasty, had set an important precedent for his successors with his ambitious efforts in territorial 
expansion and the court’s establishment of regional dominance over the leaders of local 
communities, and his son sought to follow and improve upon his father’s reign. 
 
56 SHY, 197.7730–31. 
57 Shen Kua, Mengxi bitan quanyi, p. 347. 
58 SS, 14.272. 
59 XZZTJCB, 228. 
60 XZZTJCB, 228. 
 
An important aspect of regional dominance was the maintenance of free passage through the 
frontier region. On November 26, 1068, Lý Nhật Tôn made this declaration at court, 
 
The military commanders of Guangnan and Jiangnan prefectures always make their 
presence known along the main route by which we carry memorials to the Song court. 
Persons travelling this route face difficult obstacles. The high official Nguy Trọng Hòa 
(?–?) reports that people taking this route face disruption in many counties and 
prefectures, including all kinds of fees that they must pay. I have ordered the commander 
of the Sea-based Second Circuit Prefectural Army to act according to ancient rules of 
protocol when receiving persons along this major thoroughfare. However, in the event 
that this route is disrupted or cut off, we must not show fear, but instead launch a 
vigorous defense of the Việt Kingdom.61 
 
In that year, Lý Nhât Tôn established new offices for his own government to strengthen the 
institutional control of his family. Lý dynastic power would remain strong through the end of his 
reign. 
 
However, with Lý Nhât Tôn’s death on February 2, 1072, a succession crisis in the imperial 
household nearly broke down the imperial authority that the earlier generations had managed to 
build up. The Crown Prince Lý Can Ðức (r. 1072–1127), son of a commoner consort Ỷ Lan 
(1044–1117) was only six years old when he took the throne.62 The young Vietnamese ruler and 
his regents, including the defender-in-chief (thái úy) Lý Thường Kiệt, were soon busy 
consolidating his authority in the face of court opposition from Lý Nhât Tôn’s principal wives. 
Toward this end, the young ruler turned to the frontier for political backing. The court of Can 
Ðức soon announced a general amnesty for all “outlaws (tù)” in the “protected prefectures (đô hộ 
phủ),” referring to the frontier region.63 The anonymously authored thirteenth-century court 
chronicle A Survey of the History of Việt (Việt Sử Lược) records that, in gratitude, the local 
chieftain of Lạng Châu Dương Cảnh Thông (?–?) presented a white deer to the court as tribute 
followed by numerous officials paying their respects.64 The emperor ordered that Cảnh Thông be 
granted the title Grand Guardian (thái bảo), following the precedent by Lý Phật Mã of cementing 
ties with frontier officials with this ancient Chinese honorific title. By the late summer of 1072, 
Can Ðức appears to have felt that his mandate to rule was clear, and he embarked on numerous 
imperial activities, all of which culminated in the construction of five additions to the imperial 
palace complex. 
 
Wang Anshi’s Economic Activism and a New Vision of the Frontier 
 
By early 1073, some of the most important changes in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during 
the Song period were now just beyond the horizon. These changes were influenced by two main 
factors; the increasing self-confidence of the Lý court in the projection of its autonomous 
regional authority, and the elements of Song court–sponsored programs of economic activism 
 
61 SHY, 197.7731. 
62 Lý Can Ðức would be known posthumously as Lý Nhân Tông. 
63 Anon., Việt Sử Lược, annot., Chen Chinghe (Tokyo, 1987) 2:61. 
64 Anon., Việt Sử Lượ, annot., Qian Xizuo (Taibei, 1968), p. 38. 
and military enhancement, at the urging of reform-minded official Wang Anshi, that touched on 
the frontier region. Wang’s vision of a single centrally directed state enterprise for the 
management of the empire’s resources eventually came into conflict with the Vietnamese court’s 
notion that it should manage the frontier as its rulers saw fit. When the Song leadership was no 
longer content to administer frontier matters from a distance through its vassal representative, 
conflicts along the frontier quickly escalated into open, armed hostilities. 
 
Wang Anshi had a vision for an economically and militarily revived Song imperial order that 
could once again make manifest the grand principles of “original intent” proclaimed by the sage 
rulers of antiquity.65 As Peter Bol observes, because Wang Anshi maintained, “all things are in 
principle part of the greater whole,” it became necessary for the state to reconcile and ultimately 
unite the individual interests of various social groups under the court’s leadership. As Bol further 
notes, where conservatives such as Sima Guang saw a distortion of underlying principle in the 
trend toward greater commercialization of Song society, for example, Wang Anshi saw an 
opportunity to use this trend to combine the energies of public and private interest in a more 
efficient and constructive manner. Extending the state’s reach to the frontier region was an 
extension of Wang’s vision of holistic order to the Song Empire and a rationalization of that 
empires’ potential. 
 
What had changed in the interim between Nùng Trí Cao’s rebellion and these events was that the 
Song court had been forced to reevaluate its traditional frontier policy, and the choice was made 
for more direct administration of the area. Recent scholarship has identified the personal political 
ambitions of the Shenzong emperor as the motivational forces behind most changes in frontier 
management during this period. As Paul Smith writes, “fanned as they were by imperial passion, 
irredentism and frontier adventure emerged during (Shenzong’s) reign as a potent form of 
political capital that swept a new constellation of men—including general, eunuchs, and hawkish 
bureaucrats—into power.”66 Vietnamese scholarship for this period has traditionally fixed the 
blame on Wang Anshi and his immediate supporters for territorial expansion in the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier region. However, the emperor himself had called for a more aggressive 
frontier policy wherever the Song bordered on lands formerly under Han Chinese control. 
Throughout the 1060s military officials were dispatched from Kaifeng to the prefectures of 
southeastern Guangxi to take up positions as local administrators. Imperial troops were 
transferred to the region, and the number of war-horses was increased considerably.67 During 
this same period, Shenzong’s court had closed down the border markets along the Song frontier 
with the Tangut-led Xi Xia kingdom, and the emperor himself had commended a Song general 
who had led an unprovoked attack on a Xi Xia border town.68 The emperor’s own desire to 
recover “lost” territory opened the possibility for experimentation with Wang Anshi’s policy for 
strengthened frontier administration. 
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One aspect of Wang Anshi’s 1060s program of “economic activism” that affected this general 
region was the court’s extended reach into the frontier area for new sources of revenue and 
strategically valuable items. As Paul Smith notes in a discussion of the Tea and Horse Agency 
(duda tiju chama si) in Sichuan, “by grafting native recruitment onto the strategy of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship, reform policymakers decentralized operational and personnel authority to the 
men who had most to gain from state economic activism and thus acquired for the state 
unprecedented access to Szechwan’s surplus product.”69 Although the Guangnan West circuit 
region had less to offer the court economically, horses and precious minerals either passed 
through or were found in close proximity to this are. One of Wang’s earliest reform measures in 
mid-1069 was to grant fiscal intendants in six of the Song’s southern circuits the right to 
disregard local quotas on tribute items, and instead to fill government orders by buying and 
selling these items according to their prices on the open market.70 Under Wang Anshi’s New 
Policies reforms, greater attention was paid to seeking out loyal supporters of the Song Empire 
who could assist with the systematic extraction of these resources. 
 
As historians have explored quite extensively in the past, Wang Anshi’s policies did not proceed 
uncontested at court, and this news spread beyond the frontier. Chinese officials also heard the 
news that Lý Thường Kiệt had argued publicly in Thăng Long that Wang Anshi, in his plans to 
expand the training of militias into the frontier region, had already demonstrated that the Song 
court desired to take control of the frontier, and ignore the precedent of tribute responsibilities. 
Wang had recently sent a memorial to the Song emperor Shenzong, calling for action from Song 
imperial troops.71 For these reasons, Chinese officials announced that the Vietnamese court was 
once again in danger of losing legitimacy. Cross-frontier tensions had reached a breaking point, 
and any single event could have sparked a violent reaction. 
 
In 1075, the Quảng Nguyên chieftain Lưu Ký unexpectedly launched an attack on Yongzhou; 
however, Nùng Trí Hội, now ruling from Guihua prefecture (or Wuyang grotto settlement), was 
able to ward off the attackers.72 As a result of this attack, or perhaps to preempt future 
disturbance, emperor Shenzong issued an edict that the members of the native “Five Clans” (wu 
xingfan) of northern Guangnan should present tribute to the court every five years.73 In 1073, a 
group from these communities had made a large tribute offering to the Chinese court, and 
thereafter missions had continued on an erratic schedule. The Song emperor likely desired to 
standardize relations with these communities without alienating them, given the defection of 
other groups across the frontier in this period. The Songshi estimates that the Five Clans 
amounted to a sizable population, because they were able to muster a delegation of eight hundred 
and ninety for their 1073 tribute mission.74 The Chinese emperor would need a large number of 
local allies, if he chose to mount a successful attack in the region. 
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70 Peter K. Bol, “Government, Society and State,” p. 168. 
71 Wang Anshi, “Chibang Jiaozhi” in Wang Wengong wenji (Shanghai, 1974), 1:108–9. 
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73 The “Five Clans” included the Long Fan, Fang Fan, Zhang Fan, Shi Fan, and the Luo Fan. Their home region 
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Given the changing conditions and shifting alliances along the frontier, by 1075 relations 
between Song and Ðại Việt authorities had soured considerably. One local indication of 
deteriorating relations was the Chinese court’s interest in further militarizing the frontier region 
north of the Nùng clan’s home region. In the spring of 1075, Shenzong sent two officials, Hanlin 
Academy member and director in the Ministry of Justice (xingbu langzhong) Shen Qi (1017–88) 
and former prefect of Qianzhou (today located in southern Jiangxi) Liu Yi (1017–86) to take up 
the administration of Guizhou, at the site of modern-day Guilin.75 Shen and Liu were instructed 
by the court to train the local militia in techniques of riverine warfare. Moreover, the court 
ordered the local people to cease all trade with subjects of the Ðại Việt court, further insolating 
communities that lay on the northern and southern edges of the frontier. 
 
The Vietnamese court was well aware of these activities, and it prepared a response. As is well 
known to Vietnamese readers, Lý Thường Kiệt had anticipated an attack from the north, and he 
chose what later Vietnamese historians would call an “attack in self-defense.” He divided his 
army into two groups. The objective of the first unit, under the control of his new frontier ally 
Tông Ðán and with a strong contingent of uplands inhabitants, was to invade Guangxi to attract 
Song troops stationed at Yongzhou south into the frontier.76 At this same time, the principal 
army, under the command of Lý Thường Kiệt himself, would deploy along the South China 
coast to occupy those places then left defenseless. 
 
In the autumn of 1075, Tông Ðán took control of the Guwan, Taiping, Yongping, and Qianlong 
garrisons.77 During advance of Tông Ðán’s forces, the fleet of Lý Thường Kiệt, having seized 
the two prefectures of Qinzhou and Lianzhou, advanced further into Song territory.78 To 
alleviate fear and to keep (local Song subjects) off on his rearguard, Thường Kiệt proclaimed 
that he came only to apprehend a rebel (Lưu Ký perhaps?) who had taken refuge in China and 
whom the Chinese prefect had refused to repatriate. Thường Kiệt also was presented as a 
liberator of the Chinese people, who had been impoverished and oppressed by the reforms of 
Wang Anshi.79 
 
Lý Thường Kiệt, with Tông Ðán, arrived in the early spring of 1076 at Yongzhou and devastated 
a local Song militia force under the leadership of Zhang Shoujie (d. 1076), the governor-general 
(dudu) of Guangnan West circuit. Zhang himself was beheaded in the fighting at the Kunlun 
guan (Kunlun Pass).80 After forty-two days of intense resistance and at the end of their resources, 
the defenders of the Yongzhou succumbed under a furious attack. Thousands had died in the 
fighting. The city fortress was completely razed to the ground, and its commander Su Jian (fl. 
1071–76) had killed his own family and committed suicide by refusing to leave the blazing 
 
75 DVSKTT (1993), 3.8. SS, 334.10728. Shen had had experience training frontier militia elsewhere in the empire, 
and Liu was known to the court for his book Methods of Distinguishing the Orthodox from the Heterodox (Zhengsu 
fang), in which the scholar-official described a strategy for encouraging common people to turn from local practices 
to court-sanctioned ways. 
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building.81 However, a large unit of the Song army soon approached, and the LM forces 
withdrew, taking along an enormous amount of spoils and thousands of prisoners.82 
 
Shortly before launching the attack of the Song, Lý Thường Kiệt had also led a successful 
campaign in 1069 against the southern Cham Kingdom. Therefore, the Song court called on 
Cham and Khmer forces to join the Chinese in retaliating against Vietnamese aggression.83 In 
late 1076, the combined forces under the command of Guo Kui (1022–88), acting as the Annan 
circuit punitive expedition officer (Annandao zhaotaoshi) and his assisting officer Zhao Di (?–?) 
launched a counter-attack.84 The combined Chinese army included more than 100,000 men.85 
One hundred mounted cavalrymen under the command of Tao Bi (1015–78) entered the frontier 
by way of the Left River region.86 The frontier was penetrated at three points. The Song force 
quickly took possession of the Quảng Nguyên prefecture, crushing resistance among the Ðại Việt 
loyalists and capturing the region’s leader, the aforementioned Lưu Ký, and setting fire to the 
dong dwellings.87 
 
By the beginning of 1077, the combined Song land forces had crushed Lý resistance from Cơ 
Lang and Quyết Lý, and the Chinese forces were rapidly approaching Thing Long. The Song 
armies met on northern bank of the Như Nguyệt (or Cầu) River, also known in Chinese sources 
as the Fuliang River, in modern Bắc Ninh Province.88 Lý Thường Kiệt regarded the defense of 
this river to be absolutely crucial to the Vietnamese cause, not only because the Nhu Nguyêt 
provided the last possible opportunity to protect the delta region in which the capital was located, 
but also because this region contained the home village of the dynasty’s founder, as well as the 
tombs of former rulers at Thiên Ðức.89 Lý Thường Kiệt had ordered his men to construct on the 
river’s southern bank a wide earthen rampart protected by several lines constructed from piles of 
bamboo. Most of his fleet crossed at the mouth of the Bạch Ðằng River in order to prevent the 
Chinese fleet from joining its supporting infantry units.90 
 
Nevertheless, the Song front line was able to cross the river, and soon their cavalry riders were 
no more than several miles from Thăng Long. To encourage the counter-attack, Lý Thường Kiệt 
ordered one of his officers to hide in the temple of the god of the river, Trương Hát, and to recite 
the following stanza, known to Vietnamese schoolchildren worldwide: 
 
Over the peaks and rivers of the South reigns the emperor of the South. 
Such is the destiny fixed forever on the Celestial Book. 
How dare the Barbarians invade our land? 
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Their foolish audacity will witness their bloody rout!91 
 
As legend has it, Thường Kiệt’s troops were so inspired by this stirring verse; they held their 
ground to beat back the first wave of Song attackers. The Chinese tried again to cross the river 
and were again pushed back, sustaining one thousand casualties.92 Meanwhile the invading naval 
fleet was held back by Vietnamese defenders at the coast, and so was prevented from providing 
the necessary backing to continue the attack. The Song foray into Vietnamese territory came to a 
standstill. 
 
At this point, the two opposing forces faced each other on the banks of the river. The Song forces 
bombarded Lý positions and their supporting junks. When Lý Thường Kiệt tried to take the 
offensive, he suffered a significant defeat, in which two Lý princes perished, at the Kháo Túc 
River.93 However, logistical problems, the tropical climate, and disease had decimated the Song 
army, which had lost more than half of its effectiveness. On the other side of the conflict, the 
Vietnamese court feared that a prolonged war would not produce any positive result. At this 
point Lý Thường Kiệt made peace overtures. The Song agree to withdraw their troops, but it 
retained control of five disputed regions of Quảng Nguyên (then renamed Shun’anzhou, as 
mentioned earlier), Tư Lang Châu, Môn Châu, Tô Mậu Châu, and Quang Lang, which 
comprised a major part of the modern Vietnamese provinces of Cao Bằng and Lạng Sơn. The 
leader of the Chinese assault Guo Kui had left Shun’anzhou under the administration of his 
cavalry commander Tao Bi.94 Chinese sources note that the Vietnamese had seized a section of 
Song territory along the frontier as well. The war had lasted fifteen months. When the dust had 
settled, the Ðại Việt armies had managed once again to hold off a well-equipped Song military 
force. 
 
Border Negotiations and Demarcation 
 
After a long period of strained silence between the two courts, Thăng Long agreed in 1082 to 
return the captured prefectures of Yong, Qin, and Lian, along with their inhabitants and 
prisoners-of-war, to Kaifeng. In return, Chinese authorities returned four prefectures and one 
county seized from the Vietnamese court, including Nùng Trí Cao’s birthplace and the Nùng 
clan home base Quang Nguyên.95 In the aftermath of these concessions, a poem circulated 
throughout the Song Empire, one line of which read “Because we had a hankering for Giao Chỉ 
elephants, we gave up Quảng Nguyên gold (Pin Jiaozhi xiang, que shi Guangyuan jin).”96 
 
This resolution of the border dispute did not come without a few revengeful acts by both courts. 
In the late spring of 1079, Song authorities in Guangnan captured and beheaded Nùng Trí Xuân 
(d.1079) and took his wife and children as hostages.97 In 1083, under the pretence of pursuing 
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Nùng Trí Hội, Vietnamese troops attacked his home prefecture Guihua. The Songshi reports that 
when Trí Hội approached the military commissioner (jinglueshi) Xiong Ben (1026–91) to plead 
for fresh troops to fight off the Vietnamese, Xiong instead had the chieftain brought into custody 
for questioning. Lý Can Ðức then assembled for troops to “thank” Xiong Ben, and to request the 
return of “the eight dộng,” that is, the six counties of Bảo Lạc and the two aboriginal settlements 
of Susang. 
 
However, the two courts soon recognized that the time had come to resolve their differences 
regarding sovereignty over the border regions of Quảng Nguyên and Guihua. In 1084 the 
Vietnamese court sent the Director of Military Personnel (binh bộ thị lang) Lê Văn Thịnh (fl. 
1075–96) to negotiate border issues with the Chinese. Xiong Ben sent the Left River Region’s 
military inspector and a Wang Anshi supporter Cheng Zhuo (?–?) to argue the Song’s case. In 
the vicinity of the Left River, surveying delegations from both courts inspected the area 
separately and then convened at the Song-held Yongping garrison in southernmost Guangnan.98 
 
Negotiations proceeded from July 6 to August 8, 1084. The Vietnamese delegation spoke of 
designating Quảng Nguyên and Guihua prefectures as two sides of a fixed border (qiangjie) 
region between the two states. Lê Văn Hưu’s History of the Great Viet (Ðại Việt Sử Ký) contains 
these comments about the Vietnamese negotiator: “Lê Van Thình should be regarded as a good 
official. He was someone who got along with others. He did not seek to vex (his Chinese 
counterparts) or cause trouble, and so he was able to change the attitude of the Song emperor. As 
for the six counties that Ðại Việt troops had invaded, the resources of this territory had not yet 
been utilized by anyone. The leader of the Vietnamese delegation chose a negotiation strategy 
that avoided the ill-will which might have emerged from China’s defeat at the hands of 
Vietnamese troops.”99 
 
However, Lê Van Thình proved also to be a tough negotiator, and the Chinese officials present 
found it very difficult to challenge his points.100 When the Song emperor heard of the proposal 
made by the Vietnamese court, he ordered his officials to look into Lê Van Thình’s reasons for 
wanting to retain control of Quảng Nguyên. He then offered Lê Van Thình the lavish gift of an 
ornamental belt, a robe, and five hundred bolts of thick silk. By the end of the negotiations, 
however, Lê Van Thình had retained control for the Vietnamese court of the area beyond the 
Eight Passes (bát ải), that is, Bảo Lạc and Susang. With the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations, the Songshi compilers noted, “the South’s turmoil was thus quelled.”101 
 
The Song court quickly placed the overtures for negotiations in the context of tribute protocol. 
Concerning the prefectures and counties seized by Song troops, the Chinese emperor issued the 
following edict, 
 
You, my nobleman, as the administrator of the southern kingdom of Giao Chỉ (Nanjiao), 
have for generations maintained hegemony over this region. However, you have now 
lapsed in virtue by disobeying my orders and by robbing the frontier towns. You have 
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cast aside the notions of paying heed to your ancestors and to assumptions of loyalty and 
obedience. And you have added annoyance for this court by launching your attack. Your 
troops have advanced deep into Song territory, and they are on the verge of heading home 
only after becoming exhausted. The signs of their crimes are many, and there is no need 
to list more of your transgressions. Now you are sending envoys to reestablish tribute 
relations. I have examined your messages, and opinions. Clearly, you have repented. I am 
in charge of a myriad of kingdoms, and I do not distinguish between those kingdoms 
close at hand and those far away. However, I see the people of Yongzhou and Qinzhou, 
displaced by fire and theft, long ago lost their native lands. I will wait until I have sent 
these people back to their border region before I give Quảng Nguyên and the other lands 
back to Giao Châu.102 
 
The Songshi compilers had this comment, regarding the territory, considered during the 
negotiations: 
 
Shunzhou (or Quảng Nguyên) is located in the extreme southern region, and this region 
was used to defend (the Song Empire’s) frontier. Due to the dense fog and pestilent 
conditions, and many of the region’s inhabitants died of illness. Tao Bi actually died 
while posted here. The court knew that this area was of no use, so the Chinese negotiator 
returned a total of four prefectures and one county. However, Quảng Nguyên was 
formerly attached to the Yongzhou administration region as a loose rein aboriginal 
district. It originally did not belong to Giao Chỉ.103 
 
Although all Song rulers through the period described above had allowed Vietnamese leaders to 
regulate frontier affairs in this region, the thirteenth-century Yuan-period compilers of the 
Songshi had already altered this perception to claim a precedent for direct control of this territory 
in question by Chinese authorities. 
 
By the end of the Northern Song in 1126, rulers in Kaifeng understood that the Ðại Việt region 
occupied a place one step further away from the influence of the Chinese central court. 
According to the map An Illustration of Prefectures and Commanderies Beyond the Influence of 
Our Dynasty (Benchao huawai zhoujun tu), the region labeled An Nam on this map is clearly left 
within the Song Empire, the prefectures making up the Ðại Việt territory are placed outside of 
China, retaining the same status the well-known Sixteen Prefectures (Shiliu zhou) that had once 
been lost to the Liao.104 
 
FIGURE 7.2 IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
Figure 7.2 An Illustration of Prefectures and Commanderies Beyond the Influence of Our 
Dynasty (Benchao huawai zhoujun tu) from a Song-period edition historical atlas. 
Source: Tôyô Bunko edition; Shanghai: Guji, 1989, pp. 80–81. 
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Conclusion 
 
Historians have certainly not been in total agreement when describing the state of affairs along 
the frontier in the aftermath of Nùng Trí Cao’s rebellion. The clearest discernable “school” of 
scholarship may be found among modern Vietnamese historians, who argue that the frontier 
communities rallied in support of the nation-building efforts of the Lý leadership. Much of this 
scholarship begins with the assumption that the Sino-Vietnamese frontier region had remained 
vaguely defined with the advent of the Ðại Việt Kingdom and its recognition by China.105 
However such a statement depends heavily on very modern notions of political boundaries and 
the rights and responsibilities of nation-states, which maintain these boundaries. As I have 
argued in this study, a premodern frontier can lack a clearly delineated physical demarcation, and 
still be divided into unambiguously understood spheres of administration. In the case of the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier before Nùng Trí Cao’s revolt, the Song court through the precepts of tribute 
protocol expected the Vietnamese court to manage affairs in the Chinese court’s name in this 
region. When disturbances arose, the Chinese leadership would turn to Vietnamese authorities 
for rectification. 
 
However, the Nùng Trí Cao rebellion and its aftermath would change everything. The Chinese 
court’s response to the regional tensions also reflected the increased interest of Kaifeng in the 
resources of the Guangnan region. The Song court, facing border opposition both in the northern 
and southern regions of the young empire, implemented new policies that emphasized the stricter 
definition and regulation of its internal territory.106 Changes even in the content of questions for 
the civil service examinations reflected this shift toward a more aggressive border policy.107 The 
Vietnamese court, however, viewed Nùng Trí Cao’s insurgence as an interruption in the orderly 
conduct of tribute relations. Drawing specifically on the Chinese model of tribute as signifier of 
political submission, the Ðại Việt emperor saw Nùng Trí Cao and his followers as disloyal 
subjects of his domain, worthy of punishment for this reason. 
 
In his summary of changes to frontier policy in the late Northern Song, Okada Koji has argued 
that between 1068 and Song Huizong’s Chongning reign period (1102–6), through the border 
negotiations with the Lý court, the Song court attempted to pursue a more assertive frontier 
policy by abandoning the jimi prefecture system in favor of opening up jimi territories for 
economic development, but that is new policy ultimately failed.108 Okada attributes the failure to 
two factors. First, abandoning the existing jimi system necessarily involved the establishment of 
a formal administrative arrangement that included the posting of officials to these outlying areas. 
The funding of such new positions put a greater strain on court resources at a time when Kaifeng 
could not afford the extra financial burden.109 Secondly, the Song court for purposes of taxation 
treated similarly Han settlers and non-Han frontier inhabitants outside jimi administrative 
regions. These non-Han communities were soon expected to should the greater tax burden that 
resulted from the construction of new fortification and road systems along the frontier. For this 
reason, the Tai-speaking residents of the frontier protested violently when large groups of Han 
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settlers began to flood into the region.110 By the beginning of the twelfth century, this shift in 
policy was suspended and the earlier jimi administration was reinvigorated. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Map of 1075 Song-LM frontier war (including contested territories). 
Source: Map created by James Anderson. 
 
To the south of these jimi areas, the Vietnamese leadership also changed its frontier policy to 
adopt a less territorially aggressive approach. Thăng Long’s northern expansion was reversed 
after the 1075 conflict, which altered the Vietnamese court’s direct control over local 
communities as well. The Songshi notes that soon after the frontier war Lý Nhân Tôn agreed in 
1082 to return the three captured Song prefectures Yongzhou, Qinzhou and Lianzhou along with 
one thousand prisoners-of-war, he also sent a group of 221 persons to the Song. Men over the 
age of fifteen all bore the aforementioned tattoo saying “Army of the Son of Heaven” and men 
over twenty bore the mark “conscripts of the Southern Court” (tou nanchao). Women bore the 
tattoo “official guests” (guanke) on their left hands.111 While the Vietnamese court had earlier 
regarded this population as servants in the Lý cause of expansion, turning them over to the 
Chinese authorities as a gesture of goodwill was also a sign that these frontier communities no 
longer held great importance by the 1080s. 
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However, the successful conclusion of border negotiations was indicative of more than a 
provisional resolution of differences between the three parties along the frontier. Chinese 
imperial might no longer served as a strong deterrent in the face of the Vietnamese court’s 
expansion of regional power, and the Song could do little to control or impede the refashioning 
of the Lý in the image of the Chinese imperial model. Nevertheless, the Chinese remained the 
stronger of the two parties, and Vietnamese leadership carefully maintained its tributary ties with 
the Song court out of the conviction that this system was, in the final analysis, the best option 
available. Once clear boundaries had been drawn, major military tensions quickly subsided. 
Trade issues, and not border conflict, would define the Sino-Vietnamese exchanges by the late 
eleventh century. The bonds of the tribute system would remain strong, but both sides now 
regarded the material benefits of close ties to be more important than the quest to iron out 
political differences. Ly leaders, for their part, turned their attention inward, concentrating on the 
expansion and elaboration of their own empire. The Chinese leaders also redirected their 
attention, now having more than enough to occupy their concerns along their northern, rather 
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